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high-value Natural resources:
a BlessiNg or a curse for Peace?
by Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad*
InTroducTIon 
High-value natural resources have the potential to promote and consolidate peace. Too often, however, they make the path to sustainable peace long and haz-
ardous. Valuable resources can help to jump-start development, 
secure sustainable growth, raise living standards, and increase 
economic equality. 1 They are also an important source of for-
eign currency for cash-strapped governments, can reduce depen-
dence on international aid, and can support compensation and 
post-conflict relief for war-affected populations.2 But the prom-
ise of a brighter and more peaceful future is often spoiled by 
deep-rooted corruption and patronage, which confer benefits on 
small groups rather than on the population as a whole, and by 
shortsighted management of the resources and the revenues they 
generate.3 In addition, the mere presence of high-value resources 
can jeopardize peace if the resources become the focus of vio-
lent disputes or provide financing for groups that seek to ignite 
(or resume) armed conflict.
In many post-conflict countries, revenues from high-value 
natural resources— such as oil, natural gas, minerals, gemstones, 
and timber—are an integral (and even dominant) part of the 
national economy and state budget.4 In post-conflict Algeria, 
Angola, and Sudan, for example, oil and gas account for more 
than sixty percent of government revenues and over ninety percent 
of all export revenues.5 See Figure 1. In Sierra Leone, following 
a brutal civil war that ended in 2002, when diamonds accounted 
for ninety-six percent of all exports.6 And in Chad, Iraq, Libya, 
and Nigeria—all of which were affected by armed conflict during 
the early years of the twenty-first century—oil and gas account for 
as much as seventy percent of gross domestic product and more 
than eighty percent of government revenues.7 In Niger, uranium 
and gold are important revenue sources,8 as are oil, cocoa, and 
coffee in Côte d’Ivoire,9 and diamonds and timber in the Central 
African Republic.10 In Burma, gas exports made up one-quarter 
of all exports, while forest products and gemstones were other 
important exports between 2008 and 2010.11
When peace comes, the revenues from high-value natural 
resources—when managed well—can help finance reconstruc-
tion and other vital peace-related needs.13 When mismanaged, 
however, resource revenues can undermine both economic per-
formance and the quality of governance, and thereby increase 
the risk of renewed violence.14
Recent high-prof ile reports 
by the U.N. Secretary-General, the 
World Bank, the U.N. Environment 
Programme, and the United Nations 
have highlighted the need to more 
effectively harness high-value natural 
resources for development and peace-
building.15 If managed effectively, 
high-value natural resources constitute 
substantial assets that national and 
international actors can use to sup-
port core peace building objectives, 
including macroeconomic recovery, 
generation and support of livelihood, 
the reform of governance and political 
processes, and security improvement.16
The fact that so many resource-
rich countries are unable to achieve 
long-term peace, however, raises some 
difficult questions about how high-
value resources should be managed 
in post-conflict settings. For example, 
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Figure 1. The Economic Role of the Extractive Sector in Selected 
Post-Conflict and Conflict-Affected Countries12
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how can the environmental effects of resource extraction be 
minimized? How can illegal extraction be curtailed without 
damaging livelihoods? How can one ensure that revenues are 
used to advance long-term development objectives? The goal 
of our analysis here is to provide insight into these and similar 
questions — for the benefit of national and local governments, 
national and transnational civil society organizations, extractive 
industries, and the international community. To this end, policy 
makers, field researchers, practitioners, and scholars—all of 
whom have close knowledge of the issues at hand—have been 
asked to share their views on the challenges associated with 
the management of high-value resources in post-conflict and 
conflict-affected countries.
From PoTenTIal ProsPerITy To conFlIcT:  
WhaT goes Wrong?
High-value natural resources have been associated with 
dozens of armed conflicts, millions of deaths, and the collapse 
of several peace processes; case study and statistical evidence 
confirms that such resources play a role in sparking and fuel-
ing armed civil conflict.17 According to 
data gathered by Siri Aas Rustad and Helga 
Malmin Binningsbø, between 1970 and 
2008 the portion of armed civil conflicts 
that were in some way related to high-value 
natural resources ranged from twenty-nine 
to fifty-seven percent.18 See Figure 2.
Why is peace so difficult to achieve 
and sustain in the presence of these 
resources?19 High-value natural resources 
increase the risk of conflict in a number of 
ways. The risk of conflict can be directly 
increased when access to revenues moti-
vates or finances belligerent movements, or 
when grievances are created (1) by unmet 
expectations or inequalities in the distribu-
tion of revenues, jobs, and other benefits, or 
(2) by the negative side effects of resource 
exploitation.20 The risk of conflict can be 
indirectly increased when resource sectors 
undermine a nation’s economic perfor-
mance and the quality of its institutions.21 
Thus, the three main avenues that lead 
from natural resources to armed conflict 
are resource capture, resource related grievances, and adverse 
effects on the economy and institutions.22
Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Päivi Lujala suggest that 
the capture of resources for personal or regional enrichment is a 
possible motivation for rebel uprisings and violent secessionist 
movements.23 Although resource capture can be one of the goals 
of armed rebellion, it is rarely, if ever, the sole motivation.24 
Even in Sierra Leone, where the Revolutionary United Front has 
been represented as the classic example of a predatory, greed-
driven movement, the reality is far more complex.25 More often, 
resource capture is a means of financing warfare and attracting 
supporters.26 For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or 
“FARC”) has for decades relied on kidnapping and the produc-
tion and selling drugs to finance its insurgency.27 As efforts to 
curtail FARC’s access to income from these activities have met 
with some success, FARC has turned to gold mining to support 
its violent campaign against the government.28
Grievances can motivate armed conflict, particularly when 
the parties to a resource related dispute are divided along 
ethnic, religious, or other lines.29 Among the events that may 
spark violent uprisings are land appropriation, environmental 
degradation, population displacement, large inflows of migrants, 
and frustration over unfulfilled economic expectations.30 Exam-
ples of grievance-based conflicts include Aceh, in Indonesia; 
Bougainville, in Papua New Guinea; Kurdistan, in Iraq; northern 
Niger; and southern Sudan.31 Grievances do not necessarily arise 
in the context of potential regional autonomy, as was the case in 
Aceh and South Sudan.32 They may also occur in response to the 
abuse of power by local elites, as was the case in Sierra Leone.33
With respect to economic growth and developmental out-
comes, many resource-rich countries perform poorly in compari-
son to their less resource-rich counterparts.35 This phenomenon, 
often referred to as the resource curse or the paradox of plenty,36 
is exemplified in countries such as Algeria, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Iraq, and Nigeria.37 The resource curse 
has a number of potential causes, including the following:
•	 A government that is able to finance its budget through nat-
ural resource revenues rather than public taxation can easily 
become detached from, and therefore less accountable to, 
the populace.38
Figure 2. Armed Civil Conflicts Involving High-value Natural Resources, 1970 
–200834
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•	 Resource revenues often fuel patronage, corruption, and 
rent seeking, all of which may promote the interests of a 
small and predatory elite.39 In Nigeria, for example, it is 
estimated that one percent of the population enjoys eighty 
percent of the oil revenues.40
•	 When the group in power focuses on short-term gains 
(sometimes in an effort to meet popular demands), the 
results may include overspending, poor investment deci-
sions, and ill-conceived economic policies.41
•	 In countries whose economies depend on a few valuable 
resources, the weakness of political and economic institu-
tions may be compounded by exposure to price shocks, 
which occur when rapid shifts in raw material prices lead to 
abrupt fluctuations in resource revenues.42
Political and economic underperformance is endemic in 
many resource-rich countries—which, according to empirical 
studies, renders them vulnerable 
to conflict.43 Several studies have 
documented that armed civil 
conflict is more likely to occur in 
poor countries than in rich ones.44 
Research also shows that dysfunc-
tional institutions and low state 
capacity are positively correlated 
with an increased likelihood of 
conflict.45
Supporting the case study 
evidence, several statistical studies 
document strong and signifi-
cant relationships between par-
ticular natural resources and 
conflict, but few have been able to 
disentangle the possible mecha-
nisms behind the relationships.46 
James Fearon and David Laitin, 
for example, have found that oil 
increases the likelihood of conflict—a finding that has been 
confirmed by the work of Indra de Soysa and Eric Neumayer, 
Macartan Humphreys, and Päivi Lujala.47 Lujala has also found 
that when oil and gas are located in the conflict area, conflicts 
tend to be longer and more severe.48 Taken together, Lujala shows 
that (1) oil-producing countries are 1.5 to 2 times more likely to 
experience armed civil conflict than nonproducers, and that (2) 
when internal conflict occurs in a region that has oil reserves, 
it lasts twice as long as conflicts that occur in areas without oil 
reserves, and combatant deaths are twice as high.49 Collier and 
Hoeffler’s 2006 study of conflict types links oil to higher risk of 
secessionist conflict, and Lujala shows that secessionist conflicts 
in regions with oil reserves tend to be more severe than any other 
conflicts.50
Diamonds and other gemstones have also been subject 
to statistical studies.51 Fearon and Lujala have shown that gem-
stones have effects similar to those of oil—namely, conflict is 
more likely and tends to last longer.52 The role of timber, opium, 
and other high-value crops is less clear.53 There is some evidence 
that opium cultivation makes conflicts last longer, but little 
systematic evidence links timber production to civil war.54
resources For conFlIcT
Because natural resources have varying characteristics, they 
are not equally relevant to conflict—and those that are relevant 
may be so for different reasons.55 High-value resources, for 
example, may be either renewable or nonrenewable, although 
most— such as oil, gas, rutile, coltan, cobalt, diamonds, and 
gold—are nonrenewable, and tend to be located in geographi-
cally limited areas.56 What all high-value resources have in com-
mon, however, is the potential to yield substantial revenue.57
Some high-value resources are limited to confined areas 
and depend on sophisticated and expensive extraction methods 
or require special types of transportation (e.g., pipelines).58 
Because such resources are difficult to loot and are generally 
securely controlled by the govern-
ment during periods of both peace 
and war, they provide fewer oppor-
tunities for conflict financing.59 
Thus, the revenues from resources 
such as oil, natural gas, kimberlite 
diamonds, copper, and rutile are 
likely to accrue to the central gov-
ernment and those who control it.60 
Such resources may nevertheless 
play a role in conflict: rebel move-
ments may seek to oust the govern-
ment to gain control of them, and 
if the resources are located in more 
remote areas, they may play a role 
in secessionist uprisings.61 Rebels 
may also loot existing stockpiles 
of commodities or may attempt to 
bring extraction or transportation 
to a halt, in order to cut off the 
central government from its revenue source.62 Finally, the large 
revenues derived from high-value resources may increase the 
risk of conflict through adverse effects on political and economic 
institutions.63
Some high-value resources are linked to conflict because 
of their financing potential.64 However deep grievances may be, 
rebellion is unlikely to begin or to be sustained without financ-
ing opportunities.65 Since the end of the Cold War, financing 
from the superpowers has declined and revenues from valuable 
natural resources have gained importance as a source of conflict 
financing.66 The resources most suitable for wartime looting 
have extremely high value-to-weight ratio and can be easily 
extracted, concealed, smuggled, and sold.67 Easy extraction is a 
particular advantage: a resource that can be extracted by indi-
viduals or small groups using simple tools (that is, through arti-
sanal mining techniques) can be readily exploited by rebels who 
either undertake the mining themselves or use forced labor.68 
Among the commodities with high price-to-weight ratios that 
can be artisanally mined are alluvial gold, alluvial diamonds, and 
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gemstones such as rubies and sapphires.69 Rebels do not need to 
rely on extraction directly; they also engage in illegal taxation 
of trade and export routes.70 In some cases, including Colombia 
and Nigeria, rebels have succeeded in obtaining ransoms from 
extractive firms by threatening to blow up oil pipelines or by 
kidnapping personnel working on installations.71
When it comes to conflict financing, many natural resources 
have another advantage: they are generic, which means that their 
origins cannot be traced as easily as those of manufactured prod-
ucts.72 Because generic illegal commodities can be readily inte-
grated into legal trade channels, they are a particularly lucrative 
form of contraband, with trade prices that differ only marginally 
from those of their legal counterparts.73 Another advantage of 
some high-value resources is their scarcity.74 Some occur in only 
a small number of countries and have few substitutes, and are, 
therefore, of strategic importance.75 Demand for such resources 
may sometimes override other considerations, such as the legal-
ity of the exploitation, the behavior of the government that has 
granted exploitation rights, and the role of the commodities in 
financing warfare.76
Of course, resources other than high-value minerals may 
play a role in conflict or have adverse effects on economic 
and political institutions.77 Most notable are coca and opium, 
which have been linked to conflicts in Latin America and Asia, 
respectively, and timber, which has been connected to a number 
of conflicts in Africa and Southeast Asia.78 Fisheries have also 
been used to finance conflict; in Somalia, for example, some 
warring groups have sold false fishing licenses for offshore tuna 
reserves.79
conclusIon
When conflict ends, many of the original causes often 
remain unresolved—whether they relate to resources or not—
and may even have been aggravated by the grievances and eco-
nomic and political havoc associated with the conflict itself.80 
Post-conflict countries thus face daunting challenges when it 
comes to building peace, reducing poverty, and managing natural 
resources—particularly when poor resource management may 
be undermining both peacebuilding and poverty reduction.81 
It is clear that many resource-rich post-conflict countries are 
unable to sustain peace.82 This observation has been confirmed 
by empirical studies: for example, Rustad and Binningsbø’s 
analysis of 285 episodes of armed civil conflict shows that when 
natural resources play a role, the period of post-conflict peace is 
forty percent shorter than when they do not.83
The difficulty of sustaining peace when high-value natural 
resources are involved has two key implications: (1) the conflicts 
involving such resources are generally harder to resolve; and (2) 
thus far, the measures that have been used to manage natural 
resources and their associated revenues are generally unsatis-
factory.84 Thus, improved management of high-value natural 
resources and the associated revenues is fundamental to peace 
building.
Endnotes: High-value Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse for Peace?
1 See generally Shahid Yusuf, World Bank, Economics through the Critical 
Look at Thirty Years of the World Development Report (2008) (discussing the 
successes and failures of the World Bank and global development). 
2 See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The 
Role of Natural Resources and the Environment, (Feb. 2009), http://www.unep.
org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf. 
3 See Philippe Le Billon, The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources 
and Armed Conflict, 20 Pol. geograPhy 561, 566-67, 578 (2001) (asserting that 
although many patronage systems are corrupt, the phenomenon of patronage is 
distinct from that of corruption).
continued on page 56
This article is an edited version of the first chapter 
of a volume entitled High-Value Natural Resources and 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, which addresses a full range 
of challenges associated with high-value resources in post-
conflict settings. This volume reflects the perspectives of 
forty-one contributors and considers the experiences of 
eighteen countries with analyses of additional countries. 
The volume’s chapters are grouped into five sections 
that examine specific challenges and opportunities within 
each stage of the resource chain:
1. The ways in which host governments, extractive indus-
tries, and the international community can strengthen 
the management of extraction to promote peace. 
2. The instruments used to track commodities and 
revenues.  
3. The pros and cons of various options for revenue 
distribution, including whether producing regions 
should receive preferential treatment in revenue distri-
bution, as well as measures for stemming corruption. 
4. The role of revenue allocation and institution building, 
including several in-depth case studies on various 
approaches.
5. The importance of taking local livelihoods and econo-
mies into account in the design and implementation of 
approaches to managing high-value natural resources. 
Taken together, the chapters in the volume offer a consistent 
message: proper management of high-value natural resources 
is crucial in the aftermath of armed conflict. Effective manage-
ment of these key assets can support a range of peacebuilding 
objectives—from livelihood and macroeconomic recovery, 
to good governance and inclusive political processes, to 
improved security. The volume also demonstrates that there is 
no single, universally applicable approach to natural resource 
management in post-conflict settings.
56 SuStainable Development law & policy
Endnotes: high-value Natural resources: a BlessiNg or a curse for Peace?
  continued from page 22
4 Int’l Monetary Fund (“I.M.F.”), Algeria, Country Rep. No. 05/51 (Feb. 
2005); Angola, Country Rep. No. 07/355 (Oct. 2007); Sudan, Country Rep.  
No. 11/86 (Apr. 2011); Sierra Leone, Country Rep. No. 09/12 (Jan. 2009); 
Chad, Country Rep. No. 10/196 (June 2010); Iraq, Country Rep. No. 11/75 
(Mar. 2011); Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Country Rep. No. 
08/301 (Sept. 2008); Nigeria, Country Rep. No. 11/57 (Feb. 2011); Niger, 
Country Rep. No. 09/70 (Feb. 2009); Côte d’Ivoire, Country Rep. No. 10/228 
(July 2010); Central African Republic, Country Rep. No. 10/332 (Oct. 2010); 
Sean Turnell, Finding Dollars and Sense: Burma’s Economy in 2010, in fiNdiNg  
dollars, seNse, aNd legitimacy iN Burma (Susan Levenstein ed., 2010).
5 I.M.F., Algeria, Country Rep. No. 05/51 (Feb. 2005); Angola, Country Rep. 
No. 07/355 (Oct. 2007); Sudan, Country Rep. No. 11/86 (Apr. 2011).
6 I.M.F., Sierra Leone: Selected Issues and Stat. Appendix, IMF Country 
Rep. No. 09/12 at 55 (Jan. 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/
cr0912.pdf. 
7 I.M.F., Chad: 2010 Art. IV Consultation: Staff Rep; Staff Supp.; Pub. Info. 
Notice on the Exec. Bd. Discussion; and Statement by the Exec. Dir. For Chad, 
IMF Country Rep. No. 10/196 at 5, 7 (June 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10196.pdf; I.M.F., Iraq: Second Rev. under the Stand-By 
Arrangement, Requests for Waiver of Applicability, Extension of the Arrange-
ment, and Rephasing of Access – Staff Rep; Press Release on the Exec. Bd. 
Discussion; and Statement by the Exec. Dir. for Iraq, IMF Country Rep. No. 
11/75 at 4-5 (Mar. 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1175.
pdf; I.M.F., Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Stat. Appendix, IMF 
Country Rep. No. 08/301 at 4-5 (Sept. 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/scr/2008/cr08301.pdf. 
8 I.M.F., Niger: Selected Issues and Stat. Appendix, IMF Country Rep. No. 
09/70 at 100 (Feb. 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr0970.pdf. 
9 I.M.F., Côte d’Ivoire: Second Rev. under the Three-Year Arrangement 
under the Extended Credit Facility, Request for Waivers of Nonobservance  
of Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Rev. - Staff Rep.; Staff 
Statement; Press Release on the Exec. Bd. Discussion; and Statement by the 
Exec. Dir. for Côte d’Ivoire, IMF Country Rep. No. 10/228 at 9 (July 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10228.pdf. 
10 I.M.F., Central African Republic: Sixth Rev. under the Arrangement under 
the Extended Credit Facility and Fin. Assurances Rev. – Staff Rep; Debt. Sus-
tainability Analysis; Staff Supp.; Press Release on the Exec. Bd. Discussion; 
and Statement by the Exec. Dir. For Central African Republic, IMF Country 
Rep. No. 10/332 at 5 (Oct. 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/
cr10332.pdf. 
11 See Sean Turnell, Finding Dollars and Sense: Burma’s Economy in 2010, 
in fiNdiNg dollars, seNse, aNd legitimacy iN Burma, 29 (Susan Levenstein 
ed., 2010).;.
12 For end dates of conflicts see generally Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed 
Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset, 39 J. of Peace res. 61 (2002); Lotta 
Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009, 47 J. of Peace 
res. 501 (2010). For all other data see I.M.F., Republic of Yemen, Country 
Rep. No. 01/61 (Apr. 2001); Algeria, Country Rep. No. 05/51 (Feb. 2005); 
Angola, Country Rep. No. 07/355 (Oct. 2007); Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Country Rep. No. 08/301 (Sept. 2008); Niger, Country Rep. No. 
09/70 (Feb. 2009); Chad, Country Rep. No. 10/196 (June 2010); Colombia, 
Country Rep. No. 10/156 (May 2010); Côte d’Ivoire, Country Rep. No. 10/228 
(July 2010); Democratic Republic of the Congo, Country Rep. No. 10/11 (Jan. 
2010); Iraq, Country Rep. No. 11/75 (Mar. 2011); Nigeria, Country Rep. No. 
11/57 (Feb. 2011); Sudan, Country Rep. No. 11/86 (Apr. 2011). Numbers in 
parentheses indicate the year for which the data were obtained. Where there are 
two columns instead of three, the data for the third column were unavailable. 
For post-conflict countries, data were obtained for the year following the end 
of hostilities or for the first year for which they were available. (In some cases, 
conflict reignited after the period included in the figure.) For conflict-affected 
countries, the data are for the latest year for which they were available. Country 
data reflect various resource sectors, as follows: Algeria, oil and gas; Angola, 
oil, gas, and diamonds; Chad, Colombia, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Yemen, 
oil and gas; Côte d’Ivoire, oil, gas, and coffee; the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), mining; Iraq, oil and gas. For Niger, export share data are based 
on uranium and gold, government revenues data are based on uranium, and 
gross domestic product data are based on mining.
13 See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, supra note 2. 
14 Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 56 
oxford ecoN. PaPers 563, 588 (2004). 
15 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding 
in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (June 
11, 2009), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/367/70/PDF/
N0936770.pdf?OpenElement; see also World Bank, World Development Report 
2011 (2011), http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/ default/files/pdfs/WDR2011_
Full_Text.pdf. 
16 The conceptual framework adopted in this book draws substantially from 
the Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate After-
math of Conflict (U.N. Secretary-General 2009), but the activities have been 
regrouped and supplemented by activities articulated in Guiding principles for 
stabilization and reconstruction, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards  
in Disaster Response (Sphere 2011), Civilian capacity in the aftermath of 
conflict and From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources 
and the Environment. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, 29, U.N. 
Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (June 11, 2009); U.S. Inst. of Peace and U.S. Army 
Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Inst., Guiding principles for stabilization 
and reconstruction 146 (2009), www.usip.org/ publications/guiding-principles-
stabilization-and-reconstruction; Sphere, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum 
Standards in Disaster Response, Sphere Project, http://www.sphereproject.org/
content/view/720/200/lang (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); U.N., Civilian Capacity 
in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group 
(Mar. 2011), www.civcapreview.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K5tZZE99vzs%
3d&tabid=3188&language=en-US; see also U.N. Env’t Programme, supra note 2. 
17 For the purposes of this article, the term “armed civil conflict” refers to 
both internal and internationalized internal conflicts included in the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed 
Conflict Dataset. According to the UCDP/PRIO data set, from 1989 to 2008 
there were only eight armed conflicts between independent countries. During 
the same period, more than 120 internal conflicts occurred, although some of 
these were internationalized in the sense that other countries provided military 
support for the government or for the rebels. The preponderance of internal  
conflicts is reflected in the larger volume, which focuses on resource management 
in the wake of such conflicts. See Gleditsch et al., supra note 12, at 615; see 
also Lotta Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2008, 46 J. of 
Peace res. 577 (2009); Lotta Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 
1946-2009, 47 J. of Peace res. 501 (2010).
18 See generally Siri Aas Rustad & H. M. Binningsbø, Rapid recurrence: 
Natural resources, armed conflict and peace (Center for the Study of Civil War. 
Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, Working Paper, 2010). 
19 See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, High-Value Natural Resources, Develop-
ment, and Conflict: Channels of Causation in high-value Natural resources 
aNd Post-coNflict PeaceBuildiNg (Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad eds., 
2011). 
20 See Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 14, at 588; Macartan Humphreys, Natural  
Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms, 49 
J. of coNflict resolutioN 508, 511 (2005). 
21 Humphreys, supra note 20, at 512. 
22 Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 14, at 588; Humphreys, supra note 20,  
at 511-12.
23 The numerous examples of secessionist movements in resource-rich areas 
include Aceh, Indonesia; Biafra, Nigeria; Bougainville, Papua New Guinea; 
Cabinda, Angola; Kurdistan, Iraq; and southern Sudan. Collier & Hoeffler, 
supra note 14, at 588; Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, The Political Economy of 
Secession, in NegotiatiNg self-determiNatioN 37, 47-48 (Hurst Hammun et al. 
eds., 2006); Päivi Lujala, The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel 
access to natural resources, 47 J. of Peace res. 4-5 (2010). 
24 See Paul collier et al., BreakiNg the coNflict traP: civil war aNd 
develoPmeNt Policy 63 (2003). 
25 For further discussion of the conflict in Sierra Leone, see, e.g., Roy Macon-
achie, “The Diamond Area Community Development Fund: Micropolitics and 
Community-led Development in Post-war Sierra Leone,” in See also collier et 
al., supra note 24.
26 See Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 14, at 588. 
57Fall 2011
27 Stephanie Hanson, FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left-Wing Guerrillas, couNcil 
oN foreigN relatioNs (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-
colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272#p4. 
28 Guerrilla Miners: The FARC Turn to Gold, ecoNomist at 36 (Jan. 29, 
2011); Simon Romero, In Colombia, New Gold Rush Fuels Old Conflict, 
New york times (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/
americas/04colombia.html?pagewanted=all. 
29 See collier et al., supra note 24, at 60. 
30 See U.N. Env’t Programme, supra note 2, at 6.
31 See collier & hoeffler, The Political Economy of Secession, supra note 
23, at 47-48; Michael Ross, How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? 
Evidence From Thirteen Cases, 50 iNt’l org. 35 (2004); Päivi Lujala, The 
Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources, 
47 J. of Peace res. 4-5 (2010). 
32 See collier et al., supra note 24, at 127.
33 See collier et al., supra note 24, at 127.
34 See Gleditsch et al., supra note 12, at 615 (The Uppsala Conflict Data  
Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset defines conflict 
as an armed contestation between the government in a country and a rebel  
organization in which more than twenty-five battle-related deaths occur. The 
figure includes all armed civil conflicts active from 1970 to 2008); Harbom  
& Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2008, supra note 17, at 577.; Lotta  
Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflict, 1989-2006, 44 J. of Peace res. 
623 (2007). Resource data: Rustad & Binningsbø, supra note 18.
35 richard m. auty, sustaiNiNg develoPmeNt iN miNeral ecoNomies: the 
resource curse thesis 1 (1993).
36 Id. (coining the term “resource curse,” which refers not only to poor eco-
nomic development, but also to other negative political and social outcomes  
that have been associated with abundant natural resources, including detach-
ment from the electorate and increased risk of armed conflict); terry l. karl, 
the Paradox of PleNty: oil Booms aNd Petro-states 242 (1997) (coining the 
term “paradox of plenty,” which refers to the destabilization of states endowed 
with natural resources).
37 karl, supra note 36, at 32; Nadira Lalji, The Resource Curse Revised, 29 
harv. iNt’l rev. 34 (2007); Michael L. Ross, Blood Barrels, 87 foreigN aff. 
2, 8 (2008). 
38 See Humphreys, supra note 20, at 512. 
39 kalu N. kalu, state Power, autarchy, aNd Political coNQuest iN  
NigeriaN federalism 124-26 (2008). 
40 kalu, supra note 39, at 125.
41 See U.S. Inst. of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations 
Inst., Guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction 146 (2009), www.
usip.org/ publications/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction. 
42 See collier et al., supra note 24, at 180; see also World Bank, supra note 
15, at 19.
43 See Humphreys, supra note 20, at 534; Havard Hegre & Nicholas Samba-
nis, Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset, 50 J. of  
coNflict resolutioN 508, 531 (2006). 
44 See, e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 14, at 588; James D. Fearon & 
David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 97 am. Pol. sci. rev.  
75 (2003); Hegre & Sambanis, supra note 43, at 531.
45 See, e.g., Fearon & Laitin, supra note 44. 
46 See Ross, supra note 31, at 35.
47 Fearon & Laitin, supra note 44, at 87; Indra De Soysa & Eric Neumayer, 
Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil War Onset: Results from a New Dataset 
of Natural Resource Rents, 1970-1999, 42 coNflict mgmt. aNd Peace scieNce 
201, 216 (2007); Humphreys, supra note 20, at 525; Päivi Lujala, The spoils 
of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources, 47 J. of 
Peace res. 15, 16 (2010).
48 Lujala, supra note 47, at 16. 
49 Id. 
50 See collier & hoeffler, The Political Economy of Secession, supra note 
23, at 37. 
51 See James D. Fearon, Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than 
Others?, 41 J. of Peace res. 275, 284 (2004).
52 Id. at 277. 
53 Michael Ross, What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War, 
41 J. of Peace res. 337, 338 (2004).
54 Id. at 338; Fearon, supra note 51, at 284; Siri Aas Rustad et al., Foliage and 
Fighting: Forest Resources and the Onset, Duration and Location of Civil War, 
27 Pol. geograPhy 761, 761 (2008).
55 Ross, supra note 53, at 338. 
56 See Le Billon, supra note 3, at 564. 
57 See Ross, supra note 31, at 35.
58 Id. at 52.
59 Päivi Lujala, Deadly Combat Over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, 
Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict, 53 J. of coNflict resolutioN 
50, 54 (2009) (An extreme case is offshore oil and gas drilling, in which the 
product can be exported by pipelines or ships without ever being present on 
land in the producing country.) 
60 Id. at 68.
61 See Le Billon, supra note 3, at 574.
62 See Lujala, supra note 59, at 55.
63 See Le Billon, supra note 3, at 562.
64 Id. Resources that are used to finance conflict are sometimes referred  
to as “conflict resources.” Although specific definitions of the term vary, one 
widely used definition is that of Global Witness: “Conflict resources are natu-
ral resources whose systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict 
contribute to, benefit from or result in the commission of serious violations 
of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law or violations 
amounting to crimes under international law.” Because this definition applies 
only to conflicts in which there are specific violations of international law, it 
has a somewhat narrower scope than others. See also Conflict, gloBal witNess, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict (last visited Oct. 27, 2011). 
65 See Ross, supra note 31, at 41.
66 See Le Billon, supra note 3, at 562. There are other financing sources, 
including payments from nationals living abroad and voluntary and nonvolun-
tary support from civilians.
67 See Ross, supra note 31, at 350.
68 Id. at 344.
69 Id. at 346 n.13. (Alluvial deposits are found in sand, clay, and gravel  
discharged by rivers. Existing or ancient riverbeds can be mined using simple 
tools such as shovels, buckets, and pans.).
70 World Bank. World Development Report 2011 at 81 (2011), http://wdr2011.
worldbank.org/sites/ default/files/pdfs/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf; collier et 
al., supra note 24, at 76.
71 See collier et al., supra note 24, at 77. 
72 See Ross, supra note 31, at 351 (discussing the “Kimberly Process”). 
73 See Ross, supra note 31, at 64.
74 See Le Billon, supra note 3, at 565.
75 See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, supra note 2.
76 Id.
77 See collier et al., supra note 24, at 179; Lujala, supra note 59, at 57.
78 See Fearon & Laitin, supra note 44, at 87. 
79 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection 
of Somali Natural Resources and Waters, 11-12, U.N. Doc. S/2011/661 (Oct. 
25, 2011).
80 World Bank. World Development Report 2011 at 64 (2011) http://wdr2011.
worldbank.org/sites/ (It is important to note that, in some cases, high-value 
resources have nothing to do with triggering or financing the conflict—but as 
the conflict winds down, they become important issues to be addressed in the 
peacebuilding process.).
81 See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, supra note 2. 
82 See Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 14, at 588.
83 See Rustad & Binningsbø supra note 18, at 16 (The term “conflict episode” 
refers to how a conflict is reported in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: 
a peace period is defined as the absence of conflict for more than two calendar 
years, and begins the first day that hostilities end, e.g., after military victory by 
one side.). See Gleditsch et al., supra note 12, at 615; Harbom & Wallensteen, 
Armed Conflict, 1989-2006, supra note 34; Harbom & Wallensteen, Armed 
Conflicts, 1946-2008, supra note 17, at 577. The Rustad and Binningsbø 2010 
study considers oil, gas, diamonds, minerals, forest resources, land, and agricul-
tural products (including crops used to produce drugs), and all internal conflicts 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset from 1946 through 2006. 
84 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding 
in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, 29, U.N. Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 
(June 11, 2009). 
